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is Redefining the Global War on Terror?
Adrian Guelke is Professor of Comparative Politics and director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnic 
Conflict in the School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy at Queen’s University, Belfast. 
Recent publications include The New Age of Terrorism (IB Tauris, 2009) and Terrorism and Global 
Disorder (IB Tauris, 2006). 
At the heart of the fresh approach to foreign policy promised by President Barack Obama was the repudiation of his predecessor’s approach on the issue that had dominated the administration’s 
rhetoric after 9/11, the global war on terror. Thus, one of the principal themes of Obama’s campaign for 
the presidency had been that the threat posed by al Qaeda to the United States did not necessitate or 
justify the previous administration’s departure from America’s commitment to uphold basic international 
norms on torture and the treatment of prisoners. He repeated his commitment to a change of course 
in his inaugural address in which he stated: ‘we reject as false the choice between our safety and 
our ideals’. Further, on his very first day in office, he issued four executive orders that represented 
a clear break with the policies of the Bush Administration. The operation of military tribunals at 
Guantánamo Bay was suspended, while the new administration undertook to close the detention 
facility itself within a year. Torture was outlawed in an order headed ‘ensuring legal interrogation’. 
The same order required the closure of the secret prisons that had been operated by the CIA. Another 
order set up a wide-ranging review of detention policies introduced to meet the threat of terrorism.
And to underline still further the change in approach, the very term, global war on terror, fell out 
of use. Thus, Vice President Biden’s major speech on foreign policy in Munich in February made 
no reference to GWOT or even a war on terrorism. In March, the administration came up with 
alternative language to describe America’s engagement in two wars as a result of decisions that 
the Bush Administration had made after 9/11. As various news outlets revealed, a memorandum 
circulated within the administration in March recommended use of the term, overseas contingency 
operations, in place of GWOT. These changes prompted a strong reaction from a leading figure in 
the Bush Administration, former Vice President Dick Cheney. He accused the Obama Administration 
of jeopardising the security of the United States and running the risk of another attack like that of 
9/11. He complained that Obama’s policies amounted to returning to the law enforcement mode of 
fighting terrorism, which he saw as inadequate to meeting the threat posed by al Qaeda to America.
In terms of a spectrum of counter-terrorist approaches, the law enforcement mode, which can be 
labelled more simply as criminalisation, occupies a middle point in the spectrum with suppression and 
accommodation at its opposite ends. The term, suppression, can be used to describe the ‘no holds 
barred’ approach that relies on military action and the suspension of the normal legal safeguards for 
suspects in its treatment of detainees. By contrast, at the opposite end of the spectrum, accommodation 
involves tackling terrorism by addressing the grievances seen to motivate and to sustain the resort to 
political violence; i.e. in terms of the metaphor of the guerrilla as a fish in water, draining the swamp 
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to deprive terrorists of willing recruits. Each of the approaches has 
limitations. Suppression is commonly faulted as leading to actions that 
are disproportionate and indiscriminate in their impact. Criminalisation 
tends to be criticised as a strategy of containment that relies on the legal 
system to punish perpetrators after the event. Accommodation may be 
seen as appeasement and in its assumption that legitimate grievances 
are at the root of terrorism it can be regarded as encouraging any group 
with a grievance to resort to violence. Also the solutions offered under 
the rubric of accommodation tend to be long term in nature and so do 
not in any event offer an answer to imminent threats.
While a particular government may rely predominantly on one of 
these approaches, in practice, even governments that are committed 
to suppression, for example, may acknowledge from time to time 
the relevance of dealing with the underlying conditions that give rise 
to support for organisations engaged in terrorism. Thus, periodically 
during his tenure in the White House, George W. Bush mused on the 
connection between poverty and terrorism and acknowledged the 
relevance of measures designed to counter extremism though altering 
the social conditions in which it thrived. Similarly, the sharp break with 
the policies of his predecessor that Barack Obama established at the 
outset of his presidency has been followed through, though by no means 
entirely consistently. Thus, Obama not merely persisted with the predator 
drone programme that killed large numbers of innocent bystanders 
in its efforts to assassinate particular individuals in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, but stepped up the attacks. The inconsistencies are partly 
a product of the pursuit of diverse objectives that have sometimes 
proved conflicting, but they have also partly been a product of the 
administration’s response to events. 
By emphasising due process and the rule of law, President Obama sought 
to restore America’s reputation after the damage done by reports on 
conditions at Camp Delta at Guantánamo Bay and the pictures that 
had come out of the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. He also took initiatives 
to give a larger role to diplomacy and negotiations in the conduct of 
American foreign policy as a further departure from the unilateralism 
of the Bush Administration and its single-minded reliance on military 
force to secure its objectives that had so alienated America’s allies.  Most 
notable in this respect was the speech that Obama gave in Cairo in June.
In it he called for the ending of the cycle of distrust that had arisen 
between America and Islam. He declared: ‘I have come here to seek 
a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the 
world; one based on mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based 
on the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive; and need not 
be in competition’. He underscored the need for ‘violent extremism 
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in all its forms’ to be confronted and in this context 
defended the American mission in Afghanistan. 
At the same time, he emphasised that American 
action to defend itself should be ‘respectful of the 
sovereignty of nations and the rule of law’. He also 
spoke eloquently of the need for a settlement of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And he signalled his 
readiness to engage in negotiations with Iran ‘without 
preconditions and on the basis of mutual respect’. 
But Obama’s capacity to move forward on any aspect 
of the agenda he set out in Cairo proved very limited 
in practice. Opposition to his objectives from the 
parties to the conflicts played a part in his difficulties, 
but events in the second half of 2009 also helped to 
make a mockery of his hopes. Paradoxically, Bush’s 
lack of interest in negotiated settlements had left 
regional powers free to explore the possibilities for 
progress in dialogue with their adversaries without 
the fear that America would seek to influence the 
outcome. The assumption that Obama would give 
priority to negotiations over the use of force gave 
governments facing insurgents the incentive to pre-
empt the pressures for negotiated deals by taking 
military action to shift the balance of power in their 
favour, as Israel sought to do in Gaza and as Sri 
Lanka did with greater success in its conflict with 
Tamils nationalists. 
Flawed elections in Iran and Afghanistan undermined 
the immediate relevance of diplomacy in either 
case. The suspect counting of votes in Iran ruled 
out dialogue with the regime in Tehran, in view of 
its evident lack of legitimacy in the aftermath of the 
elections. By contrast, Karzai’s weakness as a result 
of his regime’s involvement in widespread electoral 
malpractice and the increased possibility that it might 
succumb without external support to a resurgent 
Taliban pushed Obama into accepting the option 
of shoring up the regime through the dispatch of 
a further 30,000 American troops. This was after 
lengthy debate in Washington on the request of 
General McChrystal for a substantial increase of forces 
to counter the Taliban, debate prompted in part by 
the war’s growing unpopularity both because of the 
scale of American casualties and the reputation of 
the Karzai government. To justify his decision 
President Obama adopted rhetoric scarcely 
less reductionist than that of his predecessor. 
He spoke of Afghanistan and Pakistan as the 
epicentre of violent extremism posing a direct 
threat to the United States itself and linked 
the mission in Afghanistan explicitly to the 
objective of destroying al Qaeda. 
To add to Obama’s difficulties, two events 
occurred that provided further ammunition 
for rightwing critics of his approach to the 
threat of terrorism. The first was a shooting at 
an army base in Texas. On 5 November, Major 
Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire on soldiers 
awaiting medical examinations. He killed 
13 people and injured 30 others. The attack 
resembled previous ‘lone wolf’ murders, such 
as the massacre at Virginia Tech in 2007 
or the attack on an Amish school in 2006. 
But there was one significant difference. 
On the basis of his crying out ‘God is great’ 
and the subsequent uncovering of jihadist 
influences on his life, he was judged to be 
more politically than personally motivated, 
prompting descriptions in the media of his 
behaviour as not merely an act of terrorism, 
but a frightening new form of terrorism. It 
thus became possible for this event to be 
represented as an indication of the country’s 
vulnerability to international terrorism rather 
than as another example of the threat 
posed to the American public by psychotic 
individuals due to the country’s lax supervision 
of firearms. 
The Fort Hood shootings were followed by 
the attempt on Christmas Day of a Nigerian 
passenger to down a Detroit-bound jet by 
detonating explosives he had smuggled 
on board. The failed attempt bore a close 
resemblance to that of Richard Reid, the shoe-
bomber who attempted a similar feat at the 
end of December 2001 on a transatlantic 
flight bound for Miami. But as more details 
emerged about Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab’s 
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Yemeni connections, as well as the existence of previous warnings about 
his activities, critics seized on the administration’s initially relatively relaxed 
reaction to the episode to attack Obama’s approach to combating 
terrorism, with Cheney accusing him of pretending the country was 
not at war. The critics were assisted by alarmist media coverage that 
sought to make the most of a story in a quiet period for news.  
What Obama’s first year in office underscores is the difficulty for any 
administration radically to change a country’s foreign policy. The results of 
his efforts bear out the well-established realist proposition of continuity 
in foreign policy, though it might be more fashionable to make the same 
point in terms of the theory of path dependency. However, it might 
also be argued that the expectations of radical change were always 
misplaced, considering that Obama campaigned for the presidency as 
a centrist. Admittedly, Obama’s Cairo speech hinted at more radical 
possibilities than would have seemed conceivable under any of the 
other serious candidates for the presidency in 2008. But the members 
of the committee who awarded Obama the Nobel Peace Prize on the 
strength of Cairo and some of his other speeches did him no favours.
The reward for their presumption was an acceptance speech that 
showed no willingness to challenge the American mainstream, portraying 
America as a selfless force for good in virtually all of its dealings with 
the outside world over the years. His only somewhat double-edged 
concession to critics of American foreign policy was to acknowledge that 
when America acted in an arbitrary fashion it ‘undercut the legitimacy 
of future interventions’. To label Barack Obama ‘George W. Obama’, as 
some bloggers have done, goes too far. But whether in practice Obama 
is able to make a great deal of difference to American foreign policy 
in 2010 will depend on a much more favourable set of circumstances 
than he was presented with in 2009.
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